I've been thinking about Mark Miller's paintings (discussed in the previous post). I think I might have been a little unfair to Miller in that post. However, I think a case like that of Miller's paintings can be constructed for the purpose of mounting an objection against consequentialism. Here's the kind of case I have in mind:
Clark Schmiller, a painter, steals a roll of photographs and uses them as a source for a painting. Schmiller's painting, entitled "Stolen Photo," becomes a huge hit in the art world; collectors are willing to pay thousands of dollars for the painting. Collectors find it interesting to contemplate a beautiful painting whose production required the commission of an immoral act. In other words: Collectors value "Stolen Photo" because it is (1) beautiful, and (2) produced in an immoral way. Collectors say that if "Stolen Photo" were either not beautiful or not produced in an immoral way, then the painting would have very little value. In fact, they say that if the painting were either not beautiful or not produced in an immoral way, then it would be disgusting.
Suppose that stealing the photographs produces very little harm; they were stolen from someone who didn't really value his privacy, and wasn't much bothered by being deprived of his photos. Suppose also that producing the painting produces a huge amount of good; contemplating the painting produces a nearly ecstatic experience in many people.
Versions of consequentialism may have a difficult time explaining what is going on here. Let's define "consequentialism" as the view that one ought always to maximize the amount of value in the world. According to consequentialism, should Schmiller have stolen the photos in order to produce his painting, or not? Since stealing the photos did very little harm, and producing the painting did an awful lot of good, it appears that according to consequentialism, Schmiller ought to have done what he did. But in that case, (2) above is false -- the painting was not produced in an immoral way. This means the painting does not have great value after all; in fact, the painting is disgusting. In that case, Schmiller ought not have stolen the photos, since doing so caused some (small) harm to the owner of the photos. But this means the painting is produced in an immoral way; therefore, on a consequentialist view, Schmiller was right to do what he did. Etc. It appears that, unless this circle can be interrupted, the consequentialist cannot say whether Schmiller ought to have done what he did or not.
There are probably several ways in which consequentialists can interrupt this circle. For one thing, consequentialists could simply deny the value-assignments in the example; they could say either that stealing the photos does great harm, or that the painting itself does not have great value. If this strategy doesn't work, then consequentialists can say that the painting's great value does not, strictly speaking, derive from its having been produced in an immoral way. Rather, it has value because people think it was produced in an immoral way. The consequentialist can say that people will probably go on thinking that it was produced in an immoral way no matter what the truth of the matter turns out to be. In that case, the value of the painting ceases to be "unstable"; it becomes fixed by people's perceptions, and by fixing the value of the painting, the circle is interrupted. It becomes the case that Schmiller was right to produce the paintings.
I don't know if this response is adequate; its adequacy depends on questions about the nature of value. People do seem to sometimes value facts and states of affairs themselves, apart from their perceptions of them. It is possible that this is the case for the collectors. The collectors might value the immorality of Schiller's act, wholly separately from their perception that the act is immoral. That is, it is possible that, for the collectors, the painting has great value if and only if it really is both (1) beautiful and (2) produced in an immoral way. If this turns out to be the case, then its value again becomes "unstable": If it really is produced in an immoral way, then (assuming that it also really is beautiful), it has high value. But in that case, Schmiller can be excused for stealing the photos, so it is not produced in an immoral way. Thus it now has low value. But in that case...etc.
I am not sure that the case of Schmiller and "Stolen Photo" is the best one to illustrate the sort of "value-instability" I have in mind here. Maybe the case from the Confessions, in which a young St. Augustine who steals pears is pleased by the act of stealing "all the more because it was forbidden," would work better. I believe, though, that with some work, a case adequate for the present purpose could be constructed.
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